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Abstract. The BBCRS scheme is a variant of the McEliece public-key encryption scheme where the
hiding phase is performed by taking the inverse of a matrix which is of the form T+R where T is a sparse
matrix with average row/column weight equal to a very small quantity m, usually m < 2, and R is a
matrix of small rank z > 1. The rationale of this new transformation is the reintroduction of families of
codes, like generalized Reed-Solomon codes, that are famously known for representing insecure choices.
We present a key-recovery attack when z = 1 and m is chosen between 1 and 1 + R + O( 1√
n
) where
R denotes the code rate. This attack has complexity O(n6) and breaks all the parameters suggested in
the literature.
Keywords. Code-based cryptography; distinguisher; generalized Reed-Solomon codes; key-recovery;
component-wise product of codes.
Introduction
Post-quantum cryptography. All public key cryptographic primitives used in practice such as
RSA, ElGamal scheme, DSA or ECDSA rely either on the difficulty of factoring or computing
the discrete logarithm and would therefore be broken by Shor’s algorithm [24] if a large enough
quantum computer could be built. Moreover, even if a large enough quantum computer might not
be built in the next five years, it should be mentioned that tremendous progress has been made for
computing the discrete logarithm over finite fields of small characteristic with the quasi-polynomial
time algorithm of [5]. This lack of diversity in public key cryptography has been identified as a
major concern in the field of information security. For all these reasons, it would be very desirable
to be ready to replace these schemes by others that would rely on other hard problems. However
only few other proposals have emerged which are essentially hash-based signature schemes, lattice-
based, code-based and multivariate quadratic based schemes. They are either based on the problem
of solving multivariate equations over a finite field, the problem of finding a short vector in a lattice
and the problem of decoding a linear code. Those problems are known for being NP-hard and are
therefore believed to be immune to the quantum computer threat.
The McEliece cryptosystem. Among those, one of the most promising scheme is the McEliece
public key cryptosystem [20]. It is also one of the oldest public-key cryptosystem. It uses a family of
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codes for which there is a fast decoding algorithm (the binary Goppa code family here) which is used
in the decryption process whereas an attacker has only a random generator matrix of the Goppa
code which reveals nothing about the algebraic structure of the Goppa code that is used in the
decoding process. He has therefore to decode a generic linear code for which only exponential time
decoding algorithms are known. The main advantage of this system is to have very fast encryption
and decryption functions. Depending on how the parameters are chosen for a fixed security level,
this cryptosystem is about five times faster for encryption and about 10 to 100 times faster for
decryption than RSA [8]. Furthermore, it has withstood many attacking attempts. After more
than thirty five years now, it still belongs to the very few public key cryptosystems which remain
unbroken.
The use of Reed-Solomon codes in a McEliece scheme. Goppa codes are subfield subcodes
of Generalized Reed-Solomon codes (GRS codes in short). This means that a Goppa code defined
over Fq is actually the set of codewords of a GRS code defined over an extension field Fqµ (we
say that µ is the extension degree of the Goppa code) whose coordinates all belong to the subfield
Fq. Actually the fast decoding process of Goppa codes is the decoder of the underlying GRS code.
Roughly speaking, a Goppa code of length n and dimension n− 2tµ defined over Fq can correct t
errors5 and is a subfield subcode of a GRS code that can also correct t errors which is of the same
length n but has a larger dimension n − 2t and is defined over Fqµ . In this sense, the underlying
GRS code has a better error correction capacity than the Goppa code. This raises the issue of
using GRS codes instead of Goppa codes in the McEliece system. The better decoding capacity
of GRS codes translates into smaller public key sizes for the McEliece scheme which is actually
one of the main drawback of this scheme. This approach has been tried in Niederreiter’s scheme
(whose security is equivalent to the McEliece scheme) but has encountered a dreadful fate when
the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack appeared [25].
Baldi et al. approach for reviving GRS codes. In their Journal of Cryptology article [2], Baldi
et al. have suggested a new way of using GRS codes in this context. Instead of using directly such a
code, they multiplied it by the inverse of the sum T +R where T is a sparse matrix and R is a low
rank matrix. By doing this, the attacker sees a code which is radically different from a GRS code but
the legitimate user can still use the underlying GRS decoder. This thwarts the Sidelnikov-Shestakov
attack completely. However the decoding capacity of the resulting code is basically scaled down by
a factor of 1m where m denotes the average weight of rows of the matrix T . It should be noted that
the very same approach has also been tried for the Low-Density-Parity-Check code family, LDPC
in short, which is notoriously known for being insecure in a McEliece scheme [22,4,3]. In this case,
they did not even use the low rank matrix and despite of this fact the resulting public code obtained
by this multiplication is not an LDPC code anymore (it becomes a moderate-density-parity-check
code) and it seems now that if the attacker wants to break this scheme he has to be able to solve a
generic decoding problem [21]. There are therefore good reasons to believe that this approach can
be powerful for disguising the secret code structure.
An earlier attempt. Baldi et al. [1] first used this approach with T being a permutation matrix.
In this case m = 1 and nothing is lost in term of decoding capacity compared to a GRS decoder.
In other words, this allows to decrease the public key size as if we had a GRS code in the McEliece
cryptosystem. This first attempt got broken in [12,11]. Roughly speaking the reason of this attack
in this case can be traced back to two facts (i) it turns out that the resulting code is still close
5 but the dimension can be increased to n− tµ in the binary case
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to the underlying GRS code: the intersection of the public code with the secret GRS code is of
co-dimension one; (ii) there is a very powerful way of distinguishing a GRS code [12] from a random
code by computing the dimension of its square which can be used to unravel the algebraic structure
of the public code. On the other hand, when the degree of sparseness of T is > 1 the resulting code
does not have a large intersection with a GRS code and there was some hope to obtain a secure
scheme.
Our contribution: an attack which works in the regime 1 < m < 2. In the present article
we will show that despite the fact that the public code is far from being a GRS code, a similar
trick that has already been used to attack successfully in [14] some wild Goppa codes proposed in
[7] when the degree of extension is only 2 can also be used in this context. It consists in computing
the dimension of the square of shortenings of the public code. Because of the hidden structure of
the public code, the squares of some of its shortenings have a smaller dimension than the squares
of shortened random codes of the same dimension. This distinguisher is then used to unravel the
structure of the matrix T . This gives an attack of polynomial time complexity which can be used
to break the examples given in [2]. Several were broken in a few hours, and others in a few days. As
an illustration, Example 1 given in [2] with a claimed 90-bit security can be broken in 2.75 hours on
a computer equipped with Xeon 2.27GHz processor and 72 Gb of RAM. This attack works up to
values of m of order 1 +R+O( 1√
n
), where R is the rate of the public code. The attack we present
here can obviously be thwarted by taking values for m greater than 2, but in this case, since the
price to pay is a decrease of the decoding capacity by a factor of more than 2, we do not obtain
better public key sizes than the ones we obtain by using Goppa codes, or more generally alternant
codes of extension degree 2, provided we choose non wild Goppa codes in order to avoid the attack
of [14]. The complexity of the present attack is similar to that of [11], namely O(n6) where n is the
code length. More precisely, this attack starts with two steps of respective complexity O(n3) and
O(n5) and then applying the attack of [11] whose complexity is O(n6) operations in the base field.
1 GRS Codes and the Square Code Construction
We recall in this section a few relevant results and definitions from coding theory and bring in the
fundamental notion of square code construction.
Definition 1 (Generalized Reed-Solomon code). Let k and n be integers such that 1 6 k <
n 6 q where q is a prime power. The code GRSk (x,y) of dimension k is associated to a pair (x,y)
where x is an n-tuple of distinct elements of Fq and y ∈ (F×q )n, is defined as:
GRSk (x,y)
def
=
{
(y1p(x1), . . . , ynp(xn)) | p ∈ Fq[X],deg p < k
}
.
The first work that suggested to use GRS codes in a public-key encryption scheme was [23]. But
Sidelnikov and Shestakov [25] showed that for any GRS code it is possible to recover in polynomial
time a pair (x,y) defining it, which is all that is needed to decode efficiently such codes and is
therefore enough to break any McEliece type cryptosystem [20] that uses GRS codes.
Definition 2 (Componentwise products). Given two vectors a = (a1, . . . , an) and b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈
Fnq , we denote by a ? b the componentwise product
a ? b
def
= (a1b1, . . . , anbn).
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The star product a?b should be distinguished from a more common operation, namely the canonical
inner product:
a · b def=
n∑
i=1
aibi.
Definition 3 (Product of codes & square code). Let A and B be two codes of length n. The
star product code denoted by A ?B of A and B is the vector space spanned by all products a ? b
where a and b range over A and B respectively. When B = A then A ? A is called the square
code of A and is rather denoted by A 2.
Proposition 1. Let A be a code of length n, then
dim(A 2) 6 min
{
n,
(
dim(A ) + 1
2
)}
.
Proposition 2. Let A ⊂ Fnq be a code of dimension k. The complexity of the computation of a
basis of A 2 is O(k2n2) operations in Fq.
See for instance [11], for proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
The importance of the square code construction becomes clear when we compare the dimension of
the square of structured codes like GRS codes with the dimension of the square of a random code.
Roughly speaking, given a code of dimension k, the dimension of its square is linear in k if it is a
GRS code and quadratic if it is a random code as explained in the two following propositions.
Proposition 3. GRSk (x,y)
2 = GRS2k−1 (x,y ? y) .
Proof. See for instance [18, Proposition 10].
Remark 1. This property can also be used in the case 2k− 1 > n. To see this, consider the dual of
the Reed-Solomon code, which is itself a generalized Reed-Solomon code [17, Theorem 4, p.304].
Theorem 1. Let A be a random code of length n and dimension k such that n >
(
k+1
2
)
. Then, for
all integer ` <
(
k+1
2
)
,
Prob
(
dimA 2 6
(
k + 1
2
)
− `
)
= O
(
q−` · q−(n−(k+12 ))
)
, (k → +∞).
Proof. See [10].
Remark 2. A slightly weaker result was already obtained in the papers [15,16] (see also [19]).
For this reason, GRSk (x,y) can be distinguished from a random linear code of the same dimension
by computing the dimension of the associated square code. In [15,16], this phenomenon was already
observed for q-ary alternant codes (in particular Goppa codes) at very high rates whose duals
are distinguishable from random codes by the very same manner. Subsequently, the very same
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phenomenon lead to attacks on GRS based cryptosystems [12,11], to a polynomial time attack on
Wild Goppa codes over quadratic extensions [14] and to a polynomial time attack on algebraic
geometry codes [13].
Historically, the star product of codes has been used for the first time by Wieschebrink to crypt-
analyze a McEliece-like scheme [6] based on subcodes of Reed-Solomon codes [26]. The use of the
star product here is nevertheless different from the way it is used in [26]. In Wieschebrink’s pa-
per, the star product is used to identify, given a certain low codimensional subcode C of a GRS
code GRSk (x,y), a possible pair (x,y). This is achieved by computing C
2 which turns out to be
GRSk (x,y)
2 = GRS2k−1 (x,y ? y) with a high probability. The Sidelnikov and Shestakov algo-
rithm is then used on C 2 to recover a possible (x,y ? y) pair to describe C 2 as a GRS code, and
hence, a pair (x,y) is deduced for which C ⊂ GRSk (x,y).
2 Description of the Scheme
The BBCRS public-key encryption scheme given in [2] can be summarized as follows:
Secret key.
– Gsec is a generator matrix of a GRS code of length n and dimension k over Fq.
– Q
def
= T +R where T is an n×n non-singular sparse matrix with elements in Fq and average
row weight m n. Note that m is not necessarily an integer. For example m = 1.4 means
that 40% of the rows of T have weight equal to 2 and the other 60% have weight equal to 1.
– R is a rank-z matrix over Fq such that Q is invertible. In other words there exist α
def
=
(α1, . . . , αn) and β
def
= (β1, . . . , βn) such that R
def
= αTβ and αi and βi are z × 1 full rank
matrices defined over Fq for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and z 6 n.
– S is a k × k random invertible matrix over Fq.
Public key.
Gpub
def
= S−1GsecQ−1. (1)
Encryption. The ciphertext c ∈ Fnq of a plaintext m ∈ Fkq is obtained by drawing at random e
in Fnq of weight less than or equal to n−k2m (recall that m denotes the density of the matrix T )
and computing c
def
= mGpub + e.
Decryption. It consists in performing the three following steps:
1. Guessing the value of eR.
2. Calculating c′ def= cQ − eR = mS−1Gsec + eQ − eR = mS−1Gsec + eT and using the
decoding algorithm of the GRS code to recover mS−1 from the knowledge of c′.
3. Multiplying the result of the decoding by S to recover m.
Remark 3. In [2], the authors suggest to take m = 1 + n−k−3n ≈ 2−R for the density of T .
Further details on the construction of the matrix T . We deal with the case m 6 2. According
to [2] the matrix T is constructed6 as follows.
6 Actually, the authors propose three constructions for T and express a clear preference for the one described in the
present article.
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1. Choose a permutation matrix P . Replace each 1 by a random element of F×q .
2. Set t
def
= bn−k2 c, δt
def
= t− b tmc and `
def
= b(m− 1)nc. Choose a random set C of δt columns and a
random set J2 of ` rows of P .
3. For all i ∈ J2, we denote by pi(i) the integer such that P i,pi(i) 6= 0. For each i ∈ J2, choose a
random element j ∈ C \ pi(i) and add a random element of F×q at position (i, j).
We also tested another construction allowing to have row and column weight upper bounded by 2.
The sparse matrix T is constructed as T = T 1 + T 2 where:
– T 1 is of the form T 1 = D1P 1, where D1 is diagonal invertible and P 1 is a permutation matrix;
– T 2 = D2P 2, where D2 is diagonal with (m − 1)n nonzero diagonal coefficients and P 2 is a
permutation matrix;
– The matrices do not overlap, that is, there is no pair (i, j) with 1 6 i, j 6 n such that both
(T 1)ij and (T 2)ij are nonzero.
Our attack works for both choices of the matrix T . The experimental results in Sec. 6 rely on the
first construction for T .
2.1 Previous attacks and discussion on the parameters
The BBCRS scheme has been subject to an attack [11] in the case m = 1, i.e. the matrix T is a
permutation matrix and z = 1, i.e. the matrix R has rank 1. The attack presented here holds for
m < 1 +R+O( 1√
n
) and z = 1. The relevance of choosing higher m or z is discussed in Section 7.
The attack of the present article uses in its last step the attack [11] on the original system [1].
2.2 Notation
It will be convenient to bring the following notation.
– Cpub is the code with generator matrix Gpub;
– Csec is the GRS code with generator matrix Gsec, we assume that it is specified by its dual
(which is itself a GRS code) as C⊥sec = GRSn−k (x,y);
– J1 is the set of positions which correspond to rows of T of Hamming weight 1. The elements
of J1 are called the positions of degree 1. For any row i ∈ J1 of T , we define j(i) as the unique
column of T for which Tij(i) 6= 0;
– J2 is the set of positions which correspond to rows of T of Hamming weight 2. The positions in
J2 are called the positions of degree 2. When i belongs to J2, let j1 and j2 be the columns of T
for which we have Tij1 6= 0 and Tij2 6= 0. We define similarly j(i) as the set {j1, j2} in this case.
2.3 Structure of the public code
The following result explains how Cpub and Csec and their duals are related.
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Lemma 1.
Cpub = Csec(T +R)
−1 (2)
C⊥pub = C
⊥
sec(T +R)
T . (3)
Proof. The first equality follows immediately from (1), whereas the second one was is observed in
[2, p.6, Equation (8)] where a parity-check matrix for the public code Cpub is expressed in terms of
a parity-check matrix of the secret code. This can be proved as follows. For all c ∈ Csec, c′ ∈ C⊥sec,
(c(T +R)−1) · (c′(T +R)T ) = (c(T +R)−1(T +R)) · c′ = c · c′ = 0.
Moreover, since Q = T +R is invertible, we get dimC⊥sec(T +R)T + dimCsec(T +R)−1 = n, hence
the codes are dual to each other.
3 The fundamental tool: shortening and puncturing the dual of the public
code
The lemmas stated in the present subsection are proved in Appendix A.
Puncturing and shortening will play a fundamental role in the attack. Recall that for a given code
C ⊂ Fnq and a subset I of code positions the punctured code PI (C ) and shortened code SI (C ) are
defined as:
PI (C ) def=
{
(ci)i/∈I | c ∈ C
}
;
SI (C ) def=
{
(ci)i/∈I | ∃c = (ci)i ∈ C such that ∀i ∈ I, ci = 0
}
.
Given a subset I of the set of coordinates of a vector u, we denote by PI (u) the vector u punctured
at I, that is to say, indexes that are in I are removed.
First let us recall the influence of these operations on GRS codes.
Lemma 2. Let x,y be two n–tuples of element sof Fq such that x has pairwise distinct entries and
y has only nonzero entries. Let k < n and I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Then
PI (GRSk (x,y)) = GRSk (PI (x) ,PI (y)) (4)
SI (GRSk (x,y)) = GRSk−|I| (PI (x) ,yI) , (5)
for some yI ∈ Fn−|I|q depends only on y and I.
Next, with these notions at hand, it follows that the dual of the public code punctured in J2 is
very close to a GRS code. We will also need to understand the structure of versions of this code
which are shortened in positions belonging to J1 and then punctured in J2. It turns out that these
codes too are close to GRS codes. First of all, puncturing C⊥pub in the positions belonging to J2
gives “almost” a GRS code, as shown by:
Lemma 3. Let u = (ui)i∈J1 and v = (vi)i∈J1 be vectors in F
n−|J2|
q defined by
ui = xj(i)
vi = Tij(i)yj(i).
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Let D
def
= C⊥secT
T , then
PJ2 (D) ⊆ GRSn−k (u,v) . (6)
Lemma 4. Let λ and µ be vectors of Fnq such that RT = λTµ and let C⊥sec(λ)
def
= C⊥sec ∩ < λ >⊥,
C⊥pub(λ)
def
= C⊥sec(λ)(T
T +RT ). Then,
PJ2
(
C⊥pub(λ)
)
⊆ GRSn−k (u,v) , (7)
Moreover if J1 contains an information set7 of C⊥secT T and T T is invertible, then there exist a and
b in Fn−|J2|q such that for any c in PJ2
(
C⊥pub
)
, there exists a vector p in GRSn−k (u,v) for which
c = p+ (p · b)a. (8)
In particular, PJ2
(
C⊥pub
)
⊆ GRSn−k (u,v) + < a >.
If we puncture with respect to J2 shortened versions of C⊥pub in positions belonging to J1, then we
observe a similar phenomenon, namely
Lemma 5. Let I1 be a subset of code positions which is a subset of J1. Let s def= |I1| and assume
that s 6 n− k. Then there exist vectors a,u,v in Fn−s−|J2|q such that:
PJ2
(
SI1
(
C⊥pub
))
⊆ E+ < a > (9)
and E is a subcode of GRSn−k−s (u,v).
4 Key-Recovery Attack
4.1 Outline
Our key-recovery attack starts with a parity-check matrix Hpub of the (public) code Cpub. The
main goal is to recover matrices T and R, where Hpub(T
T +RT )
−1
is a parity check matrix of a
GRS code, T is a low density square matrix and R a rank 1 matrix. Recall that in our terminology,
rows of T belonging to J1 are positions of degree 1, and those in J2 are positions of degree 2. It
implies, thanks to (3), that some columns of Hpub belong to J1 and the others are in J2.
Our attack is composed of three mains steps having the following objectives:
1. Detecting columns of Hpub that belong to J2, and then deducing those of J1.
2. Transforming columns of J2 into degree 1 columns by linear combinations with columns of J1.
7 In coding theory, an information set of a code C of dimension k is a set of k positions I such that the knowledge
of a codeword c ∈ C on the positions in I determines entirely the codeword. Equivalently, if G denotes a k × n
generator matrix of the code, then the k × k submatrix of G given by extracting the columns indexed by I is
invertible.
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3. At this stage, the public code has been transformed into another code C such that there exists
a secret GRS code C ′sec and a matrix Π+R
′ where Π is a permutation matrix and R′ is rank-1
matrix such that:
C = C ′sec(Π +R
′). (10)
The third step consists then in applying the attack developed in [11] which is purposely devised
to recover a pair (Π,R′) from C as outlined in Section 2.1.
The purpose of the next sections is to describe more precisely the first two steps of the attack.
Finally, the algorithms used in our implementation are postponed in Appendix E.
4.2 A distinguisher of the public code
The attack uses in a crucial way a distinguisher which discriminates the public code from a random
code of the same dimension. It is based on square code considerations. The point is the following:
if we shorten the dual C⊥pub of the public code in a large enough set of positions I, then the
square code
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
has dimension strictly smaller than that of
(SI (C⊥rand))2 where Crand
is a random code of the same dimension as Cpub. The code
(SI (C⊥rand))2 has dimension which is
typically min
{
n− |I|, (kI+12 )} where kI stands for the dimension of SI (C⊥rand). In general, kI is
equal to n− k − |I| since dimC⊥rand = dimC⊥pub = n− k whereas we generally have:
dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
6 3(n− k) + |J2| − 3|I| − 1. (11)
In other words, when 3(n − k) + |J2| − 3|I| − 1 < min
{
n− |I|, (kI+12 )} we expect to distinguish
Cpub from a random code of the same dimension. We write here “generally” because there are some
exceptional cases where such an inequality does not hold. However in the case when I ⊂ J1, this
inequality always holds.
Proposition 4. Let I ⊆ J1, then dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
6 3(n− k)− 3|I| − 1 + |J2|.
This proposition is proved in Appendix B.
Remark 4. It turns out that a similar inequality also generally holds when I contains degree 2
positions. However in this case, the situation is more complicated and it might happen in rare cases
that this upper-bound is not met but, roughly speaking, when it happens, the actual result remains
close to this upper bound. An explanation of what happens in this case is given in Appendix C.
Experimentally, we observed that (11) was satisfied even when I contained positions of J2.
Remark 5. The use of shortening is important since in general the (dual) public code itself is non
distinguishable because its square equals the whole ambient space. However, for a part of the
parameters proposed in [2], the dual public code is distinguishable from a random code without
shortening. See §6 for further details.
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4.3 Description of the attack
First step – Distinguishing between positions in J1 and J2 Roughly speaking the attack
builds upon an algorithm which allows to distinguish between a position of degree 1 and a position
of degree 2. It turns out now that once we are able to distinguish the public code from a random
one by shortening it in a set of positions I such that:
dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
< min
{
n− |I|,
(
n− k − |I|+ 1
2
)}
, (12)
we can puncture SI
(
C⊥pub
)
in a position i that does not belong to I and this allows to distinguish
degree 1 positions from degree 2 positions. The dimension of the square code of this punctured
code will differ drastically when i is a degree 1 position (or a certain type of degree 2 position) or
a “usual” degree 2 position. When i is a degree 1 position it turns out that
dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
= dim
(
Pi
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
)))2
, (13)
whereas for “usual” degree 2 positions we observe that
dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
= dim
(
Pi
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
)))2
+ 1. (14)
Sometimes (in the “non usual” cases), we can have positions of degree 2 for which
dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
= dim
(
Pi
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
)))2
as for degree 1 positions. This happens for instance if shortening in I “induces” a degree 1 position
in i. This arises mostly when the position i of degree 2 is such that j(i) = {j1, j2} where either
j1 = j(i
′) or j2 = j(i′) for a position i′ of degree 1 that belongs to I. Further details on these
phenomena are given in Appendix C. This phenomenon really depends on the choice of I. However,
by choosing several random subsets I we quickly find a shortening set I for which the degree 2
position we want to test behaves as predicted in (14). This yields an algorithm to decide whether
a given position has degree 2. See Algorithm 1 in Appendix E.
Moreover, we explain below, how to use the above observations to compute the whole set of positions
of degree 2.
Procedure to compute J2
– Choose a set of random subsets I1, . . . , Is (in our experimentations we always chose s ≈ 20)
whose cardinals satisfy (12).
– For i = 1, . . . , s compute SIi
(
C⊥pub
)2
and call J2(i) this set of positions satisfying
dimSIi
(
C⊥pub
)2 6= dimPj (SIi (C⊥pub)2) .
– Set J2 = J2(1) ∪ · · · ∪ J2(s).
The above described procedure of degree 2 is summarized by Algorithm 2 (see Appendix E).
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Second step – Transforming degree 2 positions into degree 1 ones This step reposes on
the following statements proved in Appendix D.
Proposition 5. Let i1 ∈ J1 and i2 ∈ J2 be a position associated to i1. Let D(α, i1, i2) be an n×n
matrix which is the identity matrix with an additional entry in column i2 and row i1 that is equal
to α. Define C
def
= C⊥pubDα,i1,i2. If α = −
Ti2j1
Ti1j1
, then there exists R′ of rank at most one such that
C = C⊥sec(T
′T +R′T ) (15)
where T ′ differs from T only in row i2 and column j1, the corresponding entry being now equal to
0.
This proposition is exploited as follows.
– We first compute for a degree 1 position i1 the set of degree 2 positions i2 such that j(i1) ∈ j(i2).
These positions i2 can be detected by checking if i2 has now become a degree 1 position for
S{i1}
(
C⊥pub
)
(this is the case if and only if j(i1) ∈ j(i2)). See Algorithm 3 in Appendix E.
– Once such a pair (i1, i2) has been found we try all possible values for α ∈ F×q until we obtain
a code C for which the corresponding T ′ contains a row of index i2 which is now of Hamming
weight 1. That is to say: i2 became a position of degree 1 for C . This can be easily checked by
using the previous technique to distinguish between a position of degree 1 or 2. See Algorithm
4, in Appendix E.
– In other words, when we are successful, we obtain a new code C for which there is one more
row of weight 1. We iterate this process by replacing C⊥pub by C and J1 by J1 ∪ {i2} until we
do not find such pairs (i1, i2). For the values of m chosen in [2] and with rows of T which were
all of weight 1 or 2 we ended up with T ′ which was a permutation matrix and a code C which
was linked to the secret code by
C = C⊥sec(Π +R
′)
where Π is a permutation matrix and R′ a matrix of rank at most 1. To finish the attack, we
just apply the attack described in [11, Sec.4 ] to recover Csec.
Algorithm 5 given in Appendix E describes the complete attack.
Case of remaining degree-2 positions
It could happen that the previoulsy decribed method is unsufficient to transform every degree 2
position into a degree 1. It could for instance happen if there is a position i of degree 2 such that
for all position i′ of degree 1, j(i′) /∈ j(i). In such a situation, no position of degree 1 can be used
to eliminate this position of degree 2.
This problem can be addressed as soon as the set of positions of degree 1 contains an information
set of the code. We describe the strategy to conclude the attack in such a situation.
Let C be the code obtained after performing the two steps of the attack and assume that there
remains as nonempty set J2 of positions of degree 2, which are known (since they have been
identified during the first step of the attack). Here is the strategy
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1. Puncture C at J2. The punctured code is of the form
C ′(I +R′) (16)
where C ′ is a GRS code, I is the identity matrix and R′ a rank 1 matrix.
2. Perform the attack of [11] on PJ2 (C ). We get the knowledge of a support x′ a multiplier y′
and a rank 1 matrix R′ such that
C ′ = GRSk
(
x′,y′
)
(I +R′).
Moreover, we are able to identify the polynomials P1, . . . , Pk yielding the rows of the public
matrix Gpub.
3. For all x ∈ Fq which is not in the support x′ of C ′, compute the column
P1(x)
P2(x)
...
Pk(x)

and join it to the matrix Gpub. By this manner we get new positions of degree 1 which can be
used to eliminate the remaining positions of degree 2.
Remark 6. In our experiments, this situation never happened: we have always eliminated all the
degree 2 positions using Proposition 5.
5 Limits and Complexity of the Attack
5.1 Choosing appropriately the cardinality of I
By definition of the density m, the sets J1 and J2 have respective cardinalities (2 − m)n and
(m − 1)n. In what follows, we denote by R the rate of the public code namely R = k/n. Let us
recall that the attack shortens the dual of a public code which is of dimension n−k. The cardinality
of I is denoted by a. We list the constraints we need to satisfy for the success of the attack.
1. The shortened code should be reduced to the zero space, which implies that a < n− k.
2. The code punctured at J2 must contain an information set, that is to say:
n− k 6 |J1|. (17)
It is clear that (17) is equivalent to m 6 1 +R.
3. The computed square code in Proposition 4 should also be different from the full space which
implies:
3(n− k − a) + |J2| − 1 < n− a (18)
One can easily check that (18) is equivalent to:
a > 1
2
(
(1 +m)n− 3k
)
. (19)
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4. Finally, to have good chances that the dimension of the square code reaches the upper bound
given by Proposition 4, we also need:
3(n− k − a) + |J2| − 1 <
(
n− k − a+ 1
2
)
(20)
which is equivalent to the inequality:
a2 +
(
5− 2(n− k)
)
a+ (n− k)2 − 5(n− k) + 2(1−m)n > 0 (21)
Considering (21) as an inequality involving a degree-2 polynomial in a, we can check that its
discriminant is equal to ∆
def
= 8(m− 1)n+ 25, so that its roots are a0 and a1 where:
a0
def
= n− k − 5
2
− 1
2
√
∆ and a1
def
= n− k − 5
2
+
1
2
√
∆. (22)
Let us recall that in order to have (21) satisfied, we should have a 6 a0 or a > a1. Because of
the constraint a < n− k and since a1 > n− k, the only case to study is a 6 a0. Combining (19)
with a 6 a0, we obtain:
1
2
(
(1 +m)n− 3k
)
6 a0.
which is equivalent to the following inequality involving this time a degree-2 polynomial in m:
n2m2 + 2n(1− n− k)m+ 2kn+ k2 − 10k + n2 − 2n > 0. (23)
The discriminant of this polynomial is n2(8k + 1) and the roots are:
m0
def
= 1 +R− 1
n
−
√
8
n
R+
1
n2
and m1
def
= 1 +R− 1
n
+
√
8
n
R+
1
n2
·
Because of the fact that m 6 1 + R from (17), and since m1 > 1 + R, we conclude that the
attack can be applied as long as m 6 m0, that is to say:
m 6 1 +R− 1
n
−
√
8
n
R+
1
n2
· (24)
5. Finally, the last step of the attack consists in performing the attack of [11].
Remark 7. This upper-bound is roughly 1 +R. In [2], the authors suggest to choose m ≈ 2−R for
rates R > 12 , which is well within the reach of the present attack.
5.2 Estimating the complexity
As explained in Proposition 2, the square of a code of dimension k and length n can be computed
in O(n2k2). Let us study the costs of the steps of the attack.
– Step 1. Finding the positions of degree 2. For a constant number of subsets I of length
a 6 a0 where a0 is defined in (22), we shorten C⊥pub and compute its square. If a is close to
a0 then, the shortened code has dimension n − k − a = O(
√
n). Hence, the computation of its
square costs O(n3). Thus this first step costs O(n3) operations in Fq.
– Step 2. Transforming degree-2 positions into degree 1 positions. This is the most
expensive part of the attack. For a given position i1 ∈ J1, the computation of positions i2 of
degree 2 such that8 j(i1) ∈ j(i2) consists essentially in shortening the dual public code at i1
8 Equivalently, there exists an integer j such that T i1,j 6= 0 and T i2,j 6= 0.
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and applying to the shortened code the first step. This costs O(n3). Then, the application of
Proposition 5 to transform i2 requires to proceed to at most q linear combinations and, for each
one, to check whether the position became of degree 1. Each check has mostly the same cost as
the first step, that is O(n3). Thus, the overall cost to reduce one position of degree 2 is O(n4)
and hence the cost of this second step is O(n5).
– Step 3. According to [11], it is in O(n6).
6 Experimental Results
Table 1 gathers experimental results obtained when the attack is programmed in Magma V2.20-3
[9]. The attacked parameters are taken from [2, Tables 3 & 4] The timings given are obtained with
Intel R© Xeon 2.27GHz and 72 Gb of RAM. Our programs are far from being optimized and probably
improved programs could provide better timings and memory usage.
The running times for codes of length 346 are below 5 hours and those for codes of length 546 can
be a bit longer than one day. The total memory usage remains below 100Mb for codes of length
346 and 500Mb for codes of length 546.
(q, n, k, z) m Step 1 Step 2
(347, 346, 180, 1) 1.471 15s 18513s (≈5 hours)
(347, 346, 188, 1) 1.448 8s 10811s (≈3 hours)
(347, 346, 204, 1) 1.402 10s 8150s (≈2.25 hours)
(347, 346, 228, 1) 1.332 15s 9015s (≈2.5 hours)
(347, 346, 252, 1) 1.263 36s 10049s (≈2.75 hours)
(347, 346, 268, 1) 1.217 3s 14887s (≈4 hours)
(347, 346, 284, 1) 1.171 3s 7165s (≈2 hours)
(547, 546, 324, 1) 1.401 60s 58778s (≈16 hours)
(547, 546, 340, 1) 1.372 83s 72863s (≈20 hours)
(547, 546, 364, 1) 1.328 100s 72343s (≈20 hours)
(547, 546, 388, 1) 1.284 170s 85699s (≈24 hours)
(547, 546, 412, 1) 1.240 15s 157999s (≈43 hours)
(547, 546, 428, 1) 1.211 15s 109970s (≈30,5 hours)
Table 1. Running times
Remark 8. Since the algorithms include many random choices, the identification of pairs (i1, i2),
where i1 ∈ J1 and i2 ∈ J2 such that j(i1) ∈ j(i2) might happen quickly or be rather long. This
explains the important gaps between different running times.
Remark 9. Actually some parameters proposed in [2] were directly distinguishable without even
shortening. This holds for (q, n, k) = (347, 346, 268), (q, n, k) = (347, 346, 284) and (q, n, k) =
(547, 546, 428) with m respectively equal to 1.217, 1.171 and 1.211. This explains why the first step
is quicker for these examples.
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Remark 10. The examples [346, 180]347 and [346, 188]347 do not satisfy (24). However, they are
distinguishable by shortening and squaring and the attack works on them. Because of some cancel-
lation phenomenon for positions of degree 2 which we do not control, it may happen that the upper
bound in Proposition 4 is not sharp and that some shortenings of C⊥pub turn out to be distinguishable
while our formulas could not anticipate it.
The above remark is of interest since it points out that our attack might work for values of m above
1 +R.
7 Concluding Remarks
The papers [4,3,1,2] can be seen as an attempt of replacing the permutation matrix in the McEliece
scheme by a more complicated transformation. Instead of having as in the McEliece scheme a
relation between the secret code Csec and the public code Cpub of the form Csec = CpubΠ where Π
is a permutation matrix, it was chosen in [4,3] that
Csec = CpubT
where T is a sparse matrix of density m or as
Csec = Cpub(T +R)
where T is as before and R is of very small rank z (the case of rank 1 being probably the only
practical way of choosing this rank as will be discussed below) as in [1,2]. It was advocated that this
allows to use for the secret code Csec, codes which are well known to be weak in the usual McEliece
cryptosystem such as LDPC codes [4,3] or GRS codes [1,2]. Interestingly enough, it turns out that
for LDPC codes this basically amounts choosing a McEliece system where the density of the parity-
check matrix is increased by a large amount and the error-correction capacity is decreased by the
same multiplicative constant. The latter approach has been studied in [21], it leads to schemes with
slightly larger decoding complexity but that have at least partial security proofs.
In the case of GRS codes, the first attempt [1] of choosing for T a permutation matrix was broken
in [11, Sec.4]. It was suggested later on [2] that this attack can be avoided by choosing T of larger
density. In order to reduce the public key size when compared to the McEliece scheme based on
Goppa codes, rather moderate values of m between 1 and 2 (m = 1.4 for instance) were chosen in
[2]. We show here that the parameters proposed in [2] can be broken by a new attack computing
first the dimension of the square code of shortened versions of the dual of the public code and using
this to reduce the problem to the original problem [1] when T is a permutation matrix. This attack
can be avoided by choosing larger values for m and/or z, but this comes at a certain cost as we
now show.
Increasing z. Increasing z = 1 to larger values of z avoids the attack given here, though some of
the ideas of [11] might be used in this new context to get rid of the R part in the scheme and might
lead to an attack of reasonable complexity when z = 2 by trying first to guess several codewords
which lie in the code C
def
= C⊥secT
T ∩ C⊥pub (this code is of codimension at least z in C⊥pub). Once
C is found, we basically have to recover T and the approach used in this paper can be applied
to it. To avoid such an attack, rather large values of z have to be chosen, but the decryption cost
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becomes prohibitive by doing so. Indeed, decryption time is of order qzC where C is the decoding
complexity of the underlying GRS code. Choosing z = 2 is of questionable practical interest and
z > 2 becomes probably unreasonable.
Increasing m. Choosing values for m close enough to 2 will avoid the attack presented here.
However this also reduces strongly the gain in key size when compared to the McEliece scheme
based on Goppa or alternant codes. Indeed, assume for simplicity m = 2. We can use in such a case
for the secret code a GRS code over Fq of dimension k = n − 2t and add errors of weight 6 t2 in
the BBCRS scheme. The public key size of such a scheme is however not better than choosing in
the McEliece scheme a Goppa code of the same dimension n− 2t but which is the subfield subcode
of a GRS code over Fq2 of dimension n− t, and which can also correct t2 errors. This Goppa code
has the very same parameters and provides the same security level. For this reason, one loses the
advantages of using GRS codes when choosing m close to 2. Thus, to have interesting key sizes
and to resist to our attack m should be smaller than 2 and larger than 1 +R. One should however
be careful, since, as explained in §6, it is still unclear whether the attack fails for m closely above
1 +R.
On the other hand, it might be interesting for theoretical reasons to understand better the security
of the BBCRS scheme for larger values of m. There might be a closer connection than what it
looks between the BBCRS scheme with density m and the usual McEliece scheme with (possibly
non-binary) Goppa codes of extension degree m. The connection is that the case m = 2 is in
both cases the limiting case where the distinguishing approach of [11,14] might work (in [14], the
attack only works because wild Goppa codes are studied and this brings an additional power to
the distinguishing attack). It should also be added that it might be interesting to study the choice
of Csec being an LDPC code and Csec = Cpub(T +R) since here adding R of small rank can also
change rather drastically the property of Cpub being an LDPC code (which is at the heart of the
key attacks on McEliece schemes based on LDPC codes).
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A Proof of Lemmas 2 to 5
Notation 2. In the proofs to follow, the code D always denotes the one defined in Lemma 3, that
is
D
def
= C⊥secT
T .
Proof (Proof of Lemma 2). A codeword of GRSk (x,y) is of the form (y1P (x1), . . . , ynP (xn)) where
P ∈ Fq[X] has degree < k. Puncturing consists in removing the entries with index in I, which yields
(4). To lie in the shortened code, the polynomial P should vanish on the elements of I. Thus, it
should be of the form P (X) = (
∏
i∈I(X − xi))Q(X) for some polynomial Q of degree < k − |I|.
Hence, the words of the shortened code are of the formyi
∏
j∈I
(xi − xj)
Q(xi)

i∈{1,...,n}\I
,
where Q has degree < k − |I|, which yields (5).
Proof (Proof of Lemma 3). For any codeword c = (ci)16i6n in D , there exists a polynomial P (X) ∈
Fq[X] of degree less than n− k such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
ci =
n∑
j=1
yjP (xj)T
T
ji
=
n∑
j=1
yjP (xj)Tij .
When i is in J1, we clearly have ci = Tij(i)yj(i)P (xj(i)). This implies that
PJ2 (D) ⊆ GRSn−k (u,v) . (25)
Proof (Proof of Lemma 4). By definition of C⊥sec(λ), we have C⊥sec(λ)R
T = 0 and hence,
C⊥pub(λ) = C
⊥
sec(λ)(T
T +RT )
= C⊥sec(λ)T
T
⊆ D .
Then, using (25), we get
PJ2
(
C⊥pub(λ)
)
⊆ PJ2 (D)
⊆GRSn−k (u,v) .
This is precisely the inclusion given by (7).
Let us now assume that J1 contains an information set of C⊥sec and T T is invertible. Consider a
codeword c in C⊥pub. There exists c
′ in C⊥sec such that
c = c′(T T +RT ). (26)
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Notice now that
c′RT = c′(λTµ)
= (c′ · λ)µ.
Let p
def
= PJ2
(
c′T T
)
. Since J1 contains an information set of C⊥secT T and T T is invertible, the
composite map:
C⊥pub −→ C⊥sec −→ C⊥secT T −→ PJ2
(
C⊥secT
T
)
is an isomorphism and hence, we deduce that there exists b in Fn−|J2|q (which does not depend on
c′) such that
c′ · λ = p · b.
We define a by a
def
= PJ2 (µ) and we obtain by using (26) that
PJ2 (c) = PJ2
(
c′T T
)
+ PJ2
(
c′RT
)
= p+ (p · b)a,
which proves (8).
Proof (Proof of Lemma 5). We start by the remark that there exists a vector a0 ∈ Fnq such that
C⊥pub = Cpub(λ)
⊥+ < a0 > .
Now, after shortening at I1, there exists a1 ∈ Fn−|I1|q such that
SI1
(
C⊥pub
)
= SI1
(
Cpub(λ)
⊥
)
+ < a1 >
and finally there exists a vector a in Fn−s−|J2|q such that
PJ2
(
SI1
(
C⊥pub
))
⊆ PJ2
(
SI1
(
C⊥pub(λ)
))
+ < a > . (27)
Moreover, we have,
PJ2
(
SI1
(
C⊥pub(λ)
))
= PJ2
(
SI1
(
C⊥sec(λ)(T
T +RT )
))
= PJ2
(
SI1
(
C⊥sec(λ)T
T
))
⊆
Codim 1
PJ2 (SI1 (D)) , (28)
where we remind that D is defined in Notation 2. From the definition of D we know that
D =

 n∑
j=1
yjTijP (xj)
n
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ degP < n− k
 .
Observe that for a position i ∈ J1, we have
n∑
j=1
yjTijP (xj) = yj(i)Tij(i)P (xj(i)). (29)
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Such a coordinate vanishes if and only if P (X) is divisible by (X − xj(i)) which implies that
SI1 (D) =

 n∑
j=1
yjTij
∏
l∈I1
(xj − xj(l))P (xj)

i/∈I1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ degP < n− k − s
 .
From this and using (29) again, we obtain
E0
def
= PJ2 (SI1 (D)) =

yj(i)Tij(i) ∏
l∈I1
(xj(i) − xj(l))P (xj(i))

i∈J1\I1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ degP < n− k − s
 ·
This is clearly a GRS code of degree n− k − s. Set
E
def
= PJ2
(
SI1
(
Cpub(λ)
⊥
))
. (30)
Then, E is indeed a subcode of the GRS code E0 of codimension 1 and the lemma follows by com-
bining this equation with (27) and (28) and using that the left-hand term in (28) has codimension
1 in the right hand one.
B Proof of Proposition 4
To prove this result we will need a few additional results involving general inequalities concerning
the dimension of the square code.
Lemma 6. For all linear codes A ,B,C ∈ Fnq and all subsets I of code positions, we have
dim (A +B)2 6 dimA 2 + dimB2 + dim (A ?B) (31)
dimC 2 6 dimPI (C )2 + |I|. (32)
Proof. By definition of the square codes, one proves that (A + B)2 = A 2 + B2 + A ?B. This
leads to (31). Let A (I) be the code of dimension |I| and length n composed by all words of Fnq
supported by I and Ext(PI (C )) be the code PI (C ) extended by zero to get a code of length n.
We have:
C ⊆ Ext(PI (C ))⊕A (I),
then, thanks to (31) and since Ext(PI (C )) ?A (I) = {0} and dimA (I)2 = |I|, we get (32).
Proof (Proof of Proposition 4). We start by using Lemma 5 with I = I1. We get that there exist
vectors a,u,v in Fn−|I|−|J2|q such that
PJ2
(
SI1
(
C⊥pub
))
⊆ E+ < a >, (33)
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where E is some subcode of GRSn−k−|I1| (u,v) of codimension 1 (see (30)). From (31) with A =<
a > and B = E and Proposition 3, we deduce that
dim
(
PJ2
(
SI1
(
C⊥pub
)))2
6 1 + dim (E )2 + dimE (34)
6 1 + dim
(
GRSn−k−|I1| (u,v)
)2
+ (n− k − |I1| − 1) (35)
6 1 + 2(n− k − |I1|)− 1 + (n− k − |I1| − 1) (36)
= 3(n− k)− 3|I1| − 1. (37)
We finish by using (32) and obtain that
dim
(
SI1
(
C⊥pub
))2
6 dim
(
PJ2
(
SI1
(
C⊥pub
)))2
+ |J2|
6 3(n− k)− 3|I1| − 1 + |J2|.
C Explanations for the upper bound (11) in the case where I contains
positions of degree 2
C.1 A general upper-bound on the dimension of
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
It will be useful to have a slight variant of Proposition 4 which holds for any subset I of code
positions and which is given by
Proposition 6. Let I b a set of code positions. Let C def= SI
(
C⊥secT
T
)
and Ext(C ) be the code
obtained from C by extending by zero at positions which were shortened. If Ext(C ) *
(
Csec(λ) ⊥
)
T T
and T is invertible, we have
dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
6 dimC 2 + dimC . (38)
Proof. Recall that, from Lemma 1, we have
C⊥pub = C
⊥
sec(T
T +RT )
and that RT = λTµ. Two cases have to be considered now.
Case 1: λ ∈ Csec. This implies that C⊥sec ⊂< λ >⊥ and therefore we have that
C⊥pub = C
⊥
sec(T
T + λTµ)
= C⊥secT
T .
In such a case we have SI
(
C⊥pub
)
= C and the upper-bound follows immediately.
Case 2: λ /∈ Csec. In this case there exists a ∈ Fnq such that
C⊥sec =< a > +Csec(λ)
⊥.
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From this we deduce
C⊥pub =
(
< a > +Csec(λ)
⊥
)
(T T + λTµ)
= < b > +Csec(λ)
⊥T T ,
where b = a(T T + λTµ). This implies that there exists c ∈ Fn−|I|q such that
SI
(
C⊥pub
)
⊆< c > +SI
(
Csec(λ)
⊥T T
)
.
Then, we use the upper bound (31) of Lemma 6 with A =< c > and B = SI
(
Csec(λ)⊥T T
)
and
obtain
dimSI
(
C⊥pub
)2
6 1 + dimB2 + dimB.
We finish the proof by noticing that
B2 =
(
SI
(
Csec(λ)
⊥T T
))2
⊆
(
SI
(
C⊥secQ
T
))2
= C 2.
Moreover, dimB 6 dimC − 1 when λ /∈ Csec. Indeed, since T is assumed to be invertible and,
by assumption, λ /∈ Csec, the code Csec(λ)⊥T T has codimension 1 in C⊥secT T . Second, notice that
the code B extended by zero equals Csec(λ)⊥T T ∩ Ext(C ). Next, since by assumption Ext(C ) *
Csec(λ)⊥T T , we get that Csec(λ)⊥T T ∩ Ext(C ) has codimension 1 in C⊥secT T ∩ Ext(C ) = Ext(C ).
Therefore dimB = dimC − 1.
C.2 The graph associated to a sparsely mixed GRS code
Proposition 6 raises the issue of understanding the structure of shortenings of codes of the form
SI
(
CT T
)
9 where C is a GRS code, T is a sparse square matrix and I is a subset of code positions
of C . We denote codes of this kind shortened sparsely mixed GRS codes. We will represent them by
their defining triple (C ,T , I). A colored graph associated to the pair (T , I) will be very useful for
studying such codes. It is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (graph associated to a shortened sparsely mixed GRS code (C ,T , I)).
The graph associated to the shortened sparsely mixed GRS code (C ,T , I) is the bipartite graph
G(U ∪ V,E) given by
– set of vertices U ∪ V , with a bijection from U to the set of columns of T and where V is in
bijection with the rows of T .
– edge set E where uv is an edge of E if and only Tvu 6= 0.
All the vertices are colored in black with the exception of the vertices of V which belong to I, in
such a case they are colored in red and the vertices of V which are of degree 1 but which do not
belong to I are colored in blue.
9 To keep the connection with the BBCRS scheme and the meaning of T in the BBCRS scheme we keep the transpose
throughout the paper.
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Remark 11. Notice that for the graph associated to the triple (C⊥sec,T , I) (where I is arbitrary)
corresponding to a BBCRS scheme, the positions of degree 2 in the BBCRS scheme correspond
precisely to the vertices of V of degree 2 whereas the positions of degree 1 in the BBCRS scheme
correspond to the vertices of V of degree 1.
This graph (without the coloring) is a way of representing a code of the form GRSn−k (x,y)T T .
Consider a codeword (c1, . . . , cn) of such a code. Clearly there exists a polynomial in Fq[X] of degree
< n− k such that for any v ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have
cv =
∑
u∼v
yuvP (xu)
where yuv
def
= yuTvu and the sum is taken over all vertices u of U that are adjacent to v. To
understand the effect of shortening the code in a set of positions, consider a codeword (cv)v∈V \I of
the shortened code. The coordinates of such a codeword are given by the same formula as before,
i.e. cv =
∑
u∼v yuvP (xu) with P a polynomial of degree < n − k, but now this polynomial should
satisfy all the equations ∑
u∼i
yuvP (xu) = 0
for all the i’s that belong to I (and which are therefore colored in red).
From now on and for the rest of the section we will assume that
Assumption 3. The set of positions of degree 1 of the sparsely mixed GRS code GRSn−k (x,y)T T
contains an information set of the code and there are no positions of degree > 2.
The effect of shortening on the dimension of dimC 2 when C = SI
(
GRSn−k (x,y)T T
)
is better
understood when we study first some extremal cases
1. I contains only positions of degree 1;
2. I is reduced to a single degree 2 position.
Note: Recall that J1,J2 denote respectively the sets of degree 1 and 2 positions associated to the
sparsely mixed code GRSn−k (x,y)T T and C denotes the shortened code SI
(
GRSn−k (x,y)T T
)
.
Shortening with respect to positions of degree 1. In such a case, by using Inequality (32) from
Lemma 6 with I = J2, i.e. we expect that
dimC 2 6 PJ2 (C )2 + |J2|.
The point with this puncturing is that PJ2 (C ) = PJ2 (SI (GRSn−k (x,y))) is a GRS code of
dimension n−k−|I| and we can apply Proposition 3 to obtain that dimPJ2 (C )2 = 2(n−k−|I|)−1.
This yields the upper-bound
dimC 2 6 2(n− k)− 1− 2|I|+ |J2| (39)
It turns out that this upper-bound is typically met.
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Shortening with respect to a single position i of degree 2: I = {i}. We would typically expect that
in such a case to have
dimC 2 6 2(n− k)− 2 + |J2|
since |J2| drops by 1.
It turns out that a stronger inequality holds in this case, the point being that shortening in a degree
2 position i yields codewords of the form (
∑
u∼v yuvP (xu))v 6=i where P is a polynomial of degree
< n − k which is such that yj1iP (xj1) + yj2iP (xj2) = 0 where the two vertices of U adjacent to i
are j1 and j2 respectively. In such a case it turns out that
Proposition 7. Assume that k is an integer in the range [n−12 , n− 4]. Let a, b, λ be three elements
in Fq with a 6= b, λ 6= 0 and let F be the subcode of GRSn−k (x,y) given by
F
def
= {(yiP (xi))16i6n| degP < n− k, P (a) = λP (b)}
Then F 2 is a subcode of codimension 1 of the GRS code GRS2(n−k)−1 (x,y ? y) given by
F 2 =
{
(y2i P (xi))16i6n|degP < 2(n− k)− 1, P (a) = λ2P (b)
}
Proof. F 2 is generated by codewords of the form (y2i P (xi)Q(xi))16i6n with
degP < n− k
degQ < n− k
P (a) = λP (b)
Q(a) = λQ(b).
In other words, we proved that
F 2 ⊆ {(y2i P (xi))16i6n| degP < 2(n− k)− 1, P (a) = λ2P (b)}
and to conclude the proof, we only need to prove that dimF 2 > 2(n− k)− 2.
Let F0 ⊆ F be defined as
F0
def
=
{
(yiP (xi))16i6n| degP < n− k, P (a) = P (b) = 0
}
.
and let P,Qa, Qb be 3 polynomials of degree < n−k such that P (a) = λP (b) 6= 0, Qa vanishes with
multiplicity 2 at a and 1 at b and Qb vanishes with multiplicity 1 at a and 2 at b. The existence of
such nonzero polynomials is guaranteed since we assumed k to be 6 n − 4 and hence n − k > 4.
For the very same reason, F0 is nonzero. The code F0 is a GRS code whose square is the subcode
of GRS2(n−k)−1 (x,y) of codimension 4 corresponding to polynomials vanishing at a and b with
multiplicity 2 at both points. Thus, dimF 20 = 2(n− k)− 5. Next, one sees easily that
F 20⊕ < PQa > ⊕ < PQb > ⊕ < P 2 >⊆ F 2,
and hence F 2 has dimension at least 2(n− k)− 2. This concludes the proof.
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By applying this proposition to PJ2\{i} (C ), we easily obtain the stronger inequality
dimC 2 6 2(n− k)− 3 + |J2|,
which is nothing but (39) with |I| = 1.
Generalizing this idea to general subsets I of code positions we expect that (39) holds in all cases.
However it turns out that we have in general a stronger inequality. This is due to the fact that
shortening has sometimes long range effects. This is a point that we study in more detail in the
following subsection.
C.3 Shortening induces merging and pruning of the graph.
We first start with a few examples which will help to understand the underlying phenomena.
Example 1. Let us shorten in a single position, i.e. I = {v} with v of degree 1 adjacent to
u and we assume that there exists v′ of degree 2 adjacent to u and u′ (see Figure 1). When
Fig. 1. A first example
u u’
v v’
we shorten GRSn−k (x,y)T T in v this means that we consider only codewords of the form
(
∑
u∼w yuwP (xw))w 6=v where degP < n − k and P (xu) = 0. Notice now that because of this,
the code position v′ simplifies from yuv′P (xu) + yu′v′P (xu′) to yu′v′P (xu′). In this sense, the short-
ened sparsely mixed GRS code S{v}
(
GRSn−k (x,y)T T
)
corresponds to a subcode of the sparsely
mixed GRS code associated to a simplified graph. It is obtained from the graph associated to
the shortened sparsely mixed code by removing u and v and the incident edges. Moreover its
codewords (
∑
u∼w yuwP (xu))w∈V \{v} correspond to polynomials satisfying an additional condition,
namely P (xu) = 0.
Fig. 2. The simplified graph corresponding to the first example
u’
v v’
u u’
v’
+
u
P(x   )=0
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In the new code, a degree 2 vertex disappeared and we therefore expect that the dimension of the
square of the shortened sparsely mixed code is equal to
dim
(S{v} (GRSn−k (x,y)T T ))2 = dimPJ2\{v} (S{v} (GRSn−k (x,y)T T ))2 + |J2 \ {v}|
= 2(n− k)− 1− 2 + |J2| − 1 = 2(n− k)− 4 + |J2|.
In other words, we have to take into account that the effect of shortening may have deeper effects
than just the sum of the effects of the shortening of degree 1 positions and degree 2 positions
which decreases the dimension by a term which is |I|. As shown by this example, shortening might
remove some other degree 2 positions which were not shortened and which could be transformed
into a degree 1 position as is apparent from this example. We therefore expect that the effect of
shortening in a set I leads to a dimension for C 2 which is of the form
dimC = 2(n− k)− 1− |I|+ |J ′2|
where J ′2 is the set of code positions of degree 2 which remain after we take into account the effect
of the shortening. Next, it turns out that we have to take into account a slightly more complicated
phenomenon coming from the effect of the shortening of degree 2 positions. This is illustrated by
the next example.
Example 2. Let us consider now an example where we shorten in two positions v and v′ whose
neighborhood is specified by Figure 3.
Fig. 3. A second example
u u’
v v’v"
u"
A codeword of the shortened code S{v,v′}
(
GRSn−k (x,y)T T
)
is of the form (
∑
u∼w yuwP (xw))w∈V \{v,v′}
where P should satisfy at the same time
degP < n− k
yuvP (xu) + yu′vP (xu′) = 0
yu′v′P (xu′) + yu”v′P (xu”) = 0.
Because of these relations, the codeword position cv” which has not been shortened is of the form
cv” = yuv”P (xu) + yu”v”P (xu”) = αP (xu)
for some α that depends on the yuv’s. In other words, the codeword position v” becomes a position
of degree 1 after shortening and it makes sense to merge the nodes u, u′ and u” to represent the
fact that we have linear relations between P (xu), P (xu′) and P (xu”), see Figure 4.
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Fig. 4. The second example revisited
u u’
v v’v"
u"
v"
u,u’,u"
The effect on the dimension can be understood by using Inequality (32) of Lemma 6 and we see
that we should have
dim
(S{v,v′} (GRSn−k (x,y)T T ))2 6 dim (PJ2\{v,v′,v”} (S{v,v′} (GRSn−k (x,y)T T )))2 + |J2 \ {v, v′, v”}|
6 2(n− k)− 1− 2 + |J2| − 3 = 2(n− k)− 6 + |J2|,
where J2 is the set of degree 2 positions of the sparsely mixed code GRSn−k (x,y)T T . The −2
which follows the term 2(n−k)−1 is due to the fact that the code G def= S{v,v′}
(
GRSn−k (x,y)T T
)
is a code which satisfies
G =
{
(yu(w)wP (xu(w))w∈V \{v,v′}| degP < n− k, P (xu) = αP (xu′) = βP (xu”)
}
where u(w) is the unique vertex of U adjacent to w, α and β are nonzero elements of Fq. A
generalization of Proposition 3 leads immediately to
dim (D)2 6 2(n− k)− 1− 2.
In other words, we can quantify the effect of the shortening of degree 2 positions by merging the
vertices of U which are linked to a same vertex of V which is shortened. If we obtain a vertex
which corresponds to the merging of d vertices then this induces a drop in dimension of d− 1 (this
corresponds to a generalization of Proposition 3).
All these considerations lead to introduce the following algorithm that formalizes these considera-
tions.
Algorithm for reducing the graph after shortening.
{Merge phase}
for all red nodes v of degree 2 do
Remove v and the two edges u1v and u2v incident to it.
Merge u1 and u2.
end for
{Pruning phase}
while there is a red node v in V of degree 1 adjacent to a black node u in U do
Remove v.
if there exists a black node v′ adjacent to u which is of degree 1 then
Remove v′ and its incident edge.
end if
Remove u and all the edges adjacent to u.
end while
With the help of this algorithm we can bring in the crucial quantities which govern the dimension
of C 2 and, from Proposition 6, also
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
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– the set M of merged nodes in the graph which did not disappear during the pruning process.
– the degree d(x) of such a merged node x is defined as the number of vertices of U that have
been merged together to yield this node x.
– the remaining set J ′2 of degree 2 nodes of V after merging and pruning.
– the set I1 of degree 1 nodes of V in the original graph that have disappeared during the process.
The dimension of dimC 2 is typically given by
dimC 2 = 2(n− k)− 1− 2|I1|+ |J ′2| −
∑
x∈M
(d(x)− 1)
and from Proposition 6 (whose upper-bound is actually generally met) the dimension of dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
is typically given by
dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
= 3(n− k)− 1− 2|I1|+ |J ′2| − |I| −
∑
x∈M
(d(x)− 1). (40)
C.4 An example
We give in Figure 5 an example of a graph associated to a shortened sparsely mixed GRS code of
length 10 where we shortened 4 positions. After the merging step, the graph is transformed into
Fig. 5. An example of a graph associated to a shortened sparsely mixed GRS code
3 4
4 6 7 9 101 2 3 5 8
1 2 5 6 7 8 9 10
the graph given in Figure 6.
After the pruning step the graph further simplifies and becomes the graph given in Figure 7.
In this case
– M is a set of two merged nodes : {3, 9} and {5, 10};
– the degree of both of these merged nodes is equal to 2;
– there remains no node of degree 2 in V after merging and pruning : J ′2 = ∅.
– two vertices of V of degree 1 have disappeared during the process |I1| = 2.
If we assume that the dimension of the underlying GRS code was 6 at the beginning we therefore
expect a dimension of dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
of
dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
= 3× 6− 1− 2× 2 + 0− 4− 2 = 7
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Fig. 6. The graph obtained after the merging step
4
4 6 71 2 3 5 8
1 2 6 7 85,103,9
Fig. 7. The graph obtained after the merging and the pruning step (here red vertices and edges do not belong to the
graph, they are just here to indicate which edges and nodes have been removed).
4
4 6 71 2 3 5 8
1 2 6 7 85,103,9
C.5 The relationship between dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
and dim
(
Pi
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
)))2
A quick inspection of the reasoning underlying Formula (40) for dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2
also shows that
we expect that
dim
(
Pi
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
)))2
= 3(n− k)− 1− 2|I1|+ |J ′2| − |I| −
∑
x∈M
(d(x)− 1) if i /∈ J ′2
dim
(
Pi
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
)))2
= 3(n− k)− 1− 2|I1|+ |J ′2| − 1− |I| −
∑
x∈M
(d(x)− 1) if i ∈ J ′2
In other words we expect that
dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2 − dim(Pi (SI (C⊥pub)))2 = 0 if i /∈ J ′2
dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2 − dim(Pi (SI (C⊥pub)))2 = 1 if i ∈ J ′2
The positions of degree 2 that we detect by computing dim
(
SI
(
C⊥pub
))2−dim(Pi (SI (C⊥pub)))2
are therefore the elements of J ′2, that is the vertices which remain of degree 2 after merging and
pruning the graph.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for detecting the positions of degree 2
Function IsADegree2Position(C , i, smax)
requires:
– a code C which is of the same form as C⊥pub of the BBCRS scheme;
– i a code position of C ;
– a maximal number smax of tests.
Output: yes (if i has degree 2)/probably not (if we think that i has degree 1).
for s = 1 to smax do
I ← Random subset of {1, . . . , n} \ {i} which satisfies (12)
D ← SI (C )
if Dimension(D2) 6= Dimension(Pi
(
D2
)
) then
return yes
end if
end for
return probably not
D Proof of Proposition 5
We first notice that
C = C⊥pubDα,i1,i2
= C⊥sec(T
TD(α, i1, i2) +R
TD(α, i1, i2))
Note that RTD(α, i1, i2) and its transpose are both of rank at most one since R is of rank 6 1.
Let
ST
def
= T TD(α, i1, i2)
Denote the entry in row i and column j of T ,T T ,ST , andD(α, i1, i2) by Tij , T
T
ij , S
T
ij , andD(α, i1, i2)ij
respectively. From the very definition of D(α, i1, i2), S
T and T T coincide in all entries with the
exception of the entry in row j1 and column i2 where we have
STj1i2 =
∑
s
T Tj1sD(α, i1, i2)si2
= T Tj1i2 + αT
T
j1i1
= T Tj1i2 −
T Tj1i1Ti2j1
Ti1j1
= T Tj1i2 −
T Tj1i1T
T
j1i2
T Tj1i1
= 0
E Algorithms of the Attack
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm to compute quickly the sets J1 and J2 of positions of degree 1 and 2
Function Degree2andPositions(C , smax)
requires:
– a code C which is of the same form as C⊥pub of the BBCRS scheme;
– a maximal number smax of tests.
Output: The set J2 of positions of degree 2.
J1 ← {1, . . . , n}
J2 ← {}
for s = 1 to smax do
I ← Random subset of {1, . . . , n} which satisfies (12)
D ← SI (C )
for i ∈ J1 \ I do
if Dimension(D2) 6= Dimension(Pi
(
D2
)
) then
J1 ← J1 \ {i}
J2 ← J2 ∪ {i}
end if
end for
end for
return J1,J2
Algorithm 3 Algorithm to compute the set of positions of degree 2 which are associated to a given
position i1 of degree 1. That is positions i2 such that j(i1) ∈ j(i2)
Function AssociatedDegree2Positions(C , i1,J1,J2)
requires:
– a code C which is of the same form as C⊥pub of the BBCRS scheme;
– The sets J1,J2 of positions of respective degrees 1 and 2;
– A position i1 ∈ J1;
– a maximal number smax of tests.
Output: The set of positions of degree 2 associated to i1.
Ci1 ← Si1 (C )
J1,J2 ← Degree1and2Positions(Ci1 , smax)
return J2 \ J
Algorithm 4 Algorithm to transform a degree 2 position in a degree 1 one
Function EliminateDegree2Position(C , i1, i2, smax)
requires:
– A code C which is of the same form as C⊥pub of the BBCRS scheme;
– A position i2 ∈ J2;
– A position i1 ∈ J1 associated to i2;
– A maximal number of tests smax
Output: A pair (C ′, α), where C ′ = CD(α, i1, i2) and D(α, i1, i2) is defined in Proposition 5.
for α ∈ Fq do
C ′ ← CD(α, i1, i2)
if IsADegree2Position(C ′, i2, smax) = false then
return C ′, α
end if
end for
return “ERROR, i1 is not associated to i2”
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Algorithm 5 Complete algorithm for the attack
Function CompleteAttack(C )
requires:
– A code C which is of the same form as C⊥pub of the BBCRS scheme. That is, C = GRSn−k (x,y) (T +R)
T for
some sparse matrix T and some rank one matrix R. The set of degree 1 positions of C contains an information
set.
– A maximal number of tests smax
Output: A tuple (T˜ , R˜,u,v, I) such that PI (C ) = GRSn−k (u,v) (T˜ + R˜)T and with I as large as possi-
ble.
C ′ ← C
J1,J2 ← Degree1and2Positions(C , smax)
T˜ ← I {I is the n× n identity matrix.}
while J2 6= ∅ and J1 6= ∅ do do
i1 ← Random(J1)
J ′ ← AssociatedDegree2Positions(C ′, i1,J1,J2)
for i2 ∈ J ′ do do
C ′′, α← EliminateDegree2Position(C ′, i1, i2)
C ′ ← C ′′ {We replaced C ′ by C ′D(α, i1, i2), where D(α, i1, i2) is defined in Proposition 5}
T˜ ←D(α, i1, i2)−1T˜ {We preserve the loop invariant C ′ = C T˜}
J2 ← J2 \ {i2}
J1 ← J1 \ {i1}
J1 ← J1 ∪ {i2}
end for
end while
C ′ ← PJ2 (C ′)
T˜ ← Puncture(T˜ ,J2) {We drop the columns and the rows of T˜ that belong to J2.}
{At this point, there exist u,v, Π˜, R˜ with R˜ of rank one, Π˜ being a permutation matrix such that PI2 (C ) =
GRSn−k (u,v) (Π˜ + R˜)T T˜ .}
(Π˜, R˜,u,v)← Attack(C ′) {Here the algorithm of [11, §4] is used and give a possible Π˜,R˜, u and v that satisfy
C ′ = GRSn−k (u,v) (Π˜ + R˜)T . }
return (T˜
T
Π˜, T˜
T
R˜,u,v,J2)
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